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INTRODUCTION
When children are removed from their parents due to abuse or neglect, there are several
issues that need to be immediately addressed by the attorneys for the children and parents, the
child welfare workers, and the judge. As judges and attorneys handling child welfare cases, there
are many issues to consider; for example, can the child be safe at home? If not, where should she
live? Is there a plan in place to help the parents address the problem? What services and supports
does the child need? Traditionally, of the triad of goals in child welfare cases of safety,
permanency, and well-being, the main focus of systems improvements has been safety and
permanency. The goal of safety requires either that protections be placed in the home so children
can remain with their parents or be removed and placed with foster parents or relatives. The
second goal, permanency, encourages parties to prevent children from languishing in foster care,
which can be done by either reunifying the child with her parents as soon as possible or
terminating   the   parents’   rights   and   placing   the   child   up   for   adoption   in   addition   to   a   myriad   of  
other options.1 However, recently there have been efforts to improve attention to well-being. This
consideration is driven in part by new research on trauma and child-development and an increased
focus   on   what   is   in   the   child’s   best   interests   instead   of   what   is   in   the   parents’   or   agency’s   best  
interests.
Decisions about safety and permanency are difficult and case specific, but they are more
concrete than concerns regarding well-being. If safety concerns drove the removal of a child,
parties   generally   do   not   disagree   with   services   that   will   enhance   the   child’s   well-being, like
mental  health  services,  even  if  the  child’s  mental  health  needs  did  not  bring  the  family  into  court  
in the first place. However, when a decision regarding removal or reunification with parents
hinges on well-being  issues,  defining  “well-being”  and  tying it into safety and permanency can be
especially  controversial.   Do   you  remove  a  child   when   the   home   is  too   “dirty”?  Do   you   allow  a  
child to go back home if her parents continue smoking marijuana? The threshold between a dirty
and an unsafe home can be subjective and based on personal opinion. For example, in a
Philadelphia family court case, a parent had his rights terminated with regards to one child based
on  the  home  situation,  but  the  child’s  sibling  was  never  removed  because  a  different  caseworker  
believed the home was an appropriate place to live.2 Similarly, personal opinions about whether
children can be safe with parents who use marijuana may result in some children being returned
home while similarly situated children are left in foster care.

1
The  permanency  option  the  child  welfare  agency  and  the  parties  are  pursuing  is  referred  to  as  the  child’s  
“goal.”  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  terminating  parents’  rights  and  releasing  a  child  for  adoption  often  does  not  result  
in an adoption, causing the child to languish in foster care anyway. However, whether there are other options that would
better support permanency for the child is beyond the scope of this Article.
2

This  anecdote  is  based  on  the  author’s  personal  work  experience  in  Philadelphia  Family  Court.  
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Stability is, of course, hugely important to child well-being. Research suggests the
benefits of growing up in an intact family can even outweigh some safety concerns. Researchers
at   the   Massachusetts   Institute   of   Technology   found   that   for   cases   on   “the   margins”—where
caseworkers might disagree about whether or not to remove—long-term child well-being was
generally better supported by children remaining in the home. 3 With regards to well-being, the
main point is that well-being considerations should not unduly be a basis for removal or delay
permanency when safety can be established. All three goals are not legally equal; according to the
law, safety should be the primary concern and should trump outstanding well-being concerns
regarding removal and return decisions.4 Safety provides some clarity to the gray, murky waters
of well-being. If the dirty home is unsafe—if there are glass shards on the floor or animal feces
everywhere—the child should be removed. If the parents are unsafe when they are high—they
cannot function  and  completely  disregard  the  child’s  needs—the child should not be returned. Of
course, these situations still require subjective interpretation of specific facts, but this measure
helps eradicate some of the bias that is harming children in the name of protecting their wellbeing. Like the refrain from the excellent recruitment advertisements for foster parents,   “You  
don’t  have  to  be  perfect  to  be  a  perfect  parent.” 5 At the end of the day, birth parents do not need to
be perfect, but they must be safe. Ultimately, safety and permanency also support well-being.
This Article explores how well-being fits into the legal context with safety and
permanency. While there are obviously important roles that education, private service providers,
health care, and other factors play in child well-being, the focus here is on the responsibility and
authority   of   the   child   welfare   agency   and   the   courts   to   ensure   a   child’s   well-being. The Article
starts off by exploring how to define well-being and how to balance it with permanency and
safety. Then this Article addresses when the child welfare agency has the authority to intervene
solely due to well-being concerns and attempts to work through some of the more difficult issues,
such as poverty, substance abuse, teenage parents,   mental   health   issues,   and   “dirty”   homes.  
Finally, the Article will examine some of the options available to child welfare agencies and
courts to address well-being concerns and how best to determine if children should be returned
home.
I. WHAT IS “WELL-BEING”?
There   is   no   statutory   definition   of   “well-being.”   However,   it   is   often   characterized   as  
3

See Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster Care, 97
AM. ECON. REV. 1583, 1583, 1607 (2007).
4

See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)  (2014)  (“[The]  agency  must  make  reasonable  efforts  to  maintain  the  family  
unit   and   prevent   the   unnecessary   removal   of   a   child   from   his   [or]   her   home,   as   long   as   the   child’s   safety is   assured.”)  
(emphasis added); see also, 45 C.F.R. § 1355.25 (2014) (“The  following  principles  .  .  .  should  guide  the  States  and  Indian  
Tribes in developing, operating, and improving the continuum of child and family services. . . . The safety and well-being
of children and of all family members is paramount. When safety can be assured, strengthening and preserving families is
seen  as  the  best  way  to  promote  the  healthy  development  of  children.”);;  42  U.S.C.  § 675(1)(B) (2012) (specifying that a
case   plan   will   include   a   plan   to   “facilitate   return   of   the   child   to   his   own   safe home or the permanent placement of the
child”);;  Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5
For the Media, ADOPTUSKIDS, http://www.adoptuskids.org/for-the-media/help-raise-public-awareness
(last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
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having three broad domains: educational, physical, and emotional. Court performance measures
developed by the National Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, the National Center for
State  Courts,  and  Children’s  Bureau  Court  Improvement  Program  staff  consider  child  well-being
across the three domains.6 Measures of well-being include school placement stability, special
education, timeliness of health screenings and health assessments, preventative health care,
mental health screenings and assessments, psychotropic medications, sibling placement together,
sibling and family visitation, transition plans for youth aging out of care, and teenage parents
placed with their children.7
The  Children’s  Bureau8 also  released  an  Information  Memorandum  (“IM”)  in  April  2012  
on  the  “social  and  emotional  well-being of children and youth involved in child welfare systems. 9
The IM addresses many factors in well-being, including  “kinship  care,  family  connections,  sibling  
placements,  monthly  parent  visits,  placement  stability,”  school  stability,  and  parental  capacities. 10
Taken together, these lists suggest that well-being is broadly defined and addresses most aspects
of a child’s  life.
II. BALANCING WELL-BEING
Focusing on child well-being out of context is risky. Child welfare cases involve one or
several issues identified as safety threats; case planning and court orders address specific threats
to children and attempt to ameliorate inappropriate behaviors of parents or build their protective
capacity.11 For child welfare involvement, safety threats also have to place the child in imminent
danger.12 In one sense, well-being can be seen on a continuum with safety. As discussed above,
there is a point where a very dirty house becomes a threat to safety. There are cases where a very
poor diet can become neglect. However, until the situation moves from a general concern into a
serious threat to well-being, and thus, a danger to the child, the government is not empowered by
statute  or  case  law  to  forcefully  intervene  into  a  family’s  life.
Trying to balance safety and well-being reflects a tension between competing values.
Valuing  parents’  rights  to  raise  their  children  and  the  bonds  that parents, children, and extended
family  share  is  balanced  with  the  government’s  interest  in  children  being  safe  and  healthy.  With  
the  best  social  work  and  legal  practice,  these  values  and  interests  align  and  everyone  “wins”  by  
6

Well-Being: Court Performance Measures for Children, NAT’L CHILD WELFARE RESOURCE CENTER ON
LEGAL & JUD. ISSUES, 2 (2011), http://icmelearning.com/well-being-event/docs/Well-Being-Measures-CourtsChildren.pdf.
7

See id. at 17-29, 36-37, 40-46.

8

This is the federal agency under the U.S. Health and Human Services and the Administration for Children
and Families that oversees child welfare matters.
9

Information Memorandum, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, 1 (Apr. 17, 2012), www.acf.hhs.gov
/sites/default/files/cb/im1204.pdf.
10

Id. at 8. Parental capacities are often considered a measure of safety in child welfare. See, e.g., Therese
Roe Lund & Jennifer Renne, Child Safety: A Guide for Judges and Attorneys, A.B.A., 9 (2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/child-safety-guide.pdf.
11

See generally Lund & Renne, supra note 10.

12
See Siliven v.   Dep’t   of   Child   Servs.,   635   F.3d   921,   926   (7th   Cir.   2011)   (explaining   that   an   agency’s  
seizure of a child must be based on a reasonable belief of immediate harm, supported by probable cause, or pursuant to a
court order); Lund & Renne, supra note 10, at 2.
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keeping a family intact or pursuing swift permanency options. However, situations involving
child abuse and neglect are rarely so clear-cut. Situations arise where all of the interests cannot all
be reconciled at once; individuals involved need to look at the context, both of the competing
values and of the decision point in the case.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment gives
parents wide discretion to make decisions about their children. 13 The private interest in the
custody and care of children receives great deference absent a strong governmental interest 14 such
as protecting children from harm.15 Further, the level of involvement must be proportional to the
threats  to  the  child.  This  analysis  also  holds  true  when  the  state’s  involvement  with  the  family is
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment as a seizure16 or under the statutory clause requiring that
children  be   placed  in  “a   safe   setting  that  is  the  least-restrictive (most family like) . . .  setting.”17
The  state  can  only  infringe  on  parents’  rights  as much as is required to protect a child from harm.
Well-being factors are generally areas most agree are fundamental to raising a child and thus
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, such as making educational decisions. 18 Therefore, a
child’s   well-being alone   often   does   not   rise   to   a   “powerful   government   interest”   that   allows  
uninvited government intervention.
To put the balance between the state and family in practice, the law establishes a
threshold of safety that determines when the government can intervene to remove a child from the
home and when it must return a child to her parents. Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act 19
(“ASFA”),  the  “agency  must  make  reasonable  efforts  to  maintain  the  family  unit  and  prevent  the  
unnecessary removal of a child from  his  [or]  her  home,  as  long  as  the  child’s  safety is  assured.”20
If  “out-of-home  placement  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  immediate  safety  of  the  child,”  efforts  must  
be made to safely reunify the family.21 For  parents’  attorneys,  this  is  important  because  case plans
13

See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (foreign languages); Pierce  v.  Soc’y  of  the  Sisters  of  
the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (private school); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 21314, 232-34 (1972) (school attendance).
14

See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-53, 656-59  (1972)  (determining  that  unwed  father’s  interest  in  
raising  children  outweighs  state’s  interest  if  father  is  a  fit  parent).
15

See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (maintaining that the state has an interest in
protecting  the  welfare  of  children  that  can  be  stronger  than  parents’  interest  in  raising  the  child).
16

See Siliven, 635 F.3d at 926-28 (finding the fact that the agency placed the child with the mother based
on  suspicions  of  abuse  occurring  in  father’s  home  despite  doubts  about  the  identity   of the abuser showed less intrusion
under Fourth Amendment seizure analysis).
17

42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (2012).

18

Well-being can also include factors that help a child thrive. One well-being  indicator  is  “[c]hildren  ages  
3-5   who   were   read   to   every   day   in   the   last   week   by   a   family   member.”   America’s   Children   in   Brief:   Key   National  
Indicators of Well-Being, FED. INTERAGENCY F. ON CHILD & FAM. STAT., 20 (2012), http://www.childstats.gov
/pdf/ac2012/ac_12.pdf. Another well-being   indicator   is   “percentages   of   high   school   graduates   completing   mathematics,  
science,  and  foreign  language  coursework  in  high  school.”  Id. at 14.
19

Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
20

See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2014) (emphasis added) (providing regulations to implement the ASFA); 45
C.F.R. § 1355.25 (2014) (same).
21

45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2014).
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may require things that will benefit the family, but may not be closely related to resolving safety
threats. A common example is requiring parents to complete a GED even though the home may
be a safe place for the child to live. This is not to say that many services geared towards
enhancing well-being will not result in increased capacity of the child and parent to be safely
together, but safety must be the focus for decisions about out-of-home placement. Whether the
court may require the parent to complete a GED or other well-being focused services after
physical return is less clear.
III. APPROPRIATE WELL-BEING CONSIDERATIONS
Federal  law  broadly  mandates  consideration  of  a  child’s  well-being in removal decisions,
reasonable efforts determinations, case planning, court reviews, and permanency decisions.
Language concerning child well-being from the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
(“AACWA”)  of  1980  still  survives  in  Title  IV-E  of  the  Social  Security  Act  (“Title  IV-E”),22 the
federal  provision  appropriating  money  to  agencies  and  setting  forth  requirements.  The  term  “wellbeing”   gets   brief   specific   mention   in   Title   IV-E, but there are provisions that address all three
broad areas: physical, educational, and emotional.23
Title IV-E   requires   that   state   plans   ensure   that   “in   making . . .reasonable efforts [to
preserve   and   reunify   families],   the   child’s   health and   safety   shall   be   the   paramount   concern.”24
Title IV-E addresses educational well-being  by  requiring  that  the  “education records  of  the  child”  
be included in case plans25 and that an effort is made to ensure educational stability. 26 Title IV-E
also supports emotional well-being by emphasizing the continuity of relationships and familial
bonds through relative notice requirements27 and maintaining sibling connections. 28 Child welfare
agencies   also   have   a   role   in   ensuring   “early   and   periodic   screening,   diagnostic,   and   treatment  
services”  (“EPSD&T”),  which  directly  affect  child  well-being.29
In court hearings, judges must review whether  the  child’s  and  family’s  needs—including
well-being needs—are being met. Section 675(5)(B) of Title 42 of the United States Code
requires periodic reviews to determine the appropriateness of the placement, compliance with the
22

The AACWA amended Title IV of the Social Security Act to add Part E. Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500, 501 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-76).  While  the  term  “well-being”  was  not  used  in  AACWA,  the  law  required  written  
case  plans  to  “improve  the  conditions  in  the  parents’  home,  facilitate  return  of  the  child  to  his  own  home  or  the  permanent  
placement of the child,  and  address  the  needs  of  the  child  while  in  foster  care.”  94  Stat.  at  510;;  see 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B)
(2012)   (specifying   that   a   case   plan   will   include   a   plan   to   “facilitate   return   of   the   child   to   his   own   safe home or the
permanent placement of the child”)  (emphasis  added).
23

See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(31) (2012) (regarding sibling contact); 42 U.S.C. § 671(c) (2012) (regarding
confidentiality). The  term  ”well-being”  is  mentioned  several  times  in   regulations implementing the Social Security Act.
See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1357.10(c) (2014) (defining Child and Family Services Plans).
24

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).

25

Id. § 675(1)(C).

26

Id. § 675(1)(G).

27

Id. § 671(a)(29).

28

Id. § 671(a)(31).USC § 671(a)(31) (2012)

29

Id. § 1396a(a)(43) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (2012)).
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case plan, progress made to  remedy  the  issues  that  led  to  foster  care,  and  “to  project  a  likely  date  
by which the child may be returned to and safely maintained in the home or placed for adoption or
legal  guardianship.”30 Though this section still highlights the safety threshold, the appropriateness
of the case plan and placement provisions also involve well-being factors.
In addition to legislation, case law addresses well-being   issues   from   a   child’s   rights  
perspective holding in some cases that foster children are entitled to minimum levels of wellbeing.31 Some federal courts have even held that children have an individual right to case plans
and reviews.32 There are circuit splits and the standards set are fairly low, but there is at least
some authority that children in the child welfare system have constitutional due process rights to
appropriate care and services.33
IV. AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE IN NEGLECT CASES
In cases where well-being   is   a   primary   issue,   it   may   be   true   that   the   child’s   situation  
would   be   improved   “but   for”   the   concerns presented by the facts in the case. However, the
question is whether the child welfare agency or courts can compel parents to remedy those
conditions.   Some   states   find   authority   to   intervene   by   including   the   term   “well-being”   in   their  
statutory definitions of neglect,34 and others find constructive authority through references to
well-being   domains   in   statutes.   The   terms   “necessary,”   “essential,”   and   “adequate”   are   often  
found  in  these  sections,  showing  a  threshold  well  above  merely  “best  interests”  for the system to
become involved in a family. 35 For   example,   in   Arkansas,   “neglect”   includes   “[f]ailure   or  
irremediable inability to provide for the essential and necessary physical, mental, or emotional
needs  of  the  child.”36 In Connecticut, a neglected child  is  one  “who,  for  reasons  other  than  being  
impoverished . . . is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally,

30

Id. § 675(5)(B).

31

E.g., Brian A. ex rel. Brooks v. Sundquist, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941, 947 (M.D. Tenn. 2000), aff’d  sub  nom.  
Brian A. ex rel. Brooks v. Hattaway,  83  F.  App’x  692  (6th  Cir.  2003);;   Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F.
Supp. 1268, 1284 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
32

See, e.g., Brian A., 149 F. Supp. 2d at 947; Jeanine B., 877 F. Supp. at 1284; contra Charlie H. v.
Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476, 485 (D.N.J. 2000); Carson P. ex rel. Foreman v. Heineman, 240 F.R.D. 456, 542 (D. Neb.
2007).
33

See, e.g., Brian A., 149 F. Supp. 2d at 952-56; Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 854, 856-57

(Wash. 2003).
34

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(14)(A)(ii) ( 2014); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 46b-120(6) (West
2015); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 901(18)(b)(1) (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1602(28)(a) (2014); 325 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/3 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(y) (West 2014) (defining abuse); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 600.020(1)(a)(8) (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(l)(i) (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.110(12) (West 2014);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21(c)(7) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-2(E)(2) (West 2014); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 2151.03(A)(3) (LexisNexis 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-2(4) (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6105(27)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2014).
35

However, if a state law provides authority to remove a child at a lower well-being threshold, it might not
actually be a proper case for the state to claim Title IV-E money and the authority to intervene is questionable in light of
parental rights cases cited in note 13 above.
36

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(14)(A)(iv) (2014) (emphasis added).
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emotionally  or   morally.” 37 A  child  is  considered  neglected   when  he  or  she   “is   not  receiving  the  
proper or necessary support or medical or other remedial care recognized under Illinois state law
as  necessary  for  a  child’s  well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being, including
adequate   food,   clothing   and   shelter.” 38 In   Delaware,   failing   to   provide   “necessary care”   for   the  
child’s   “general   well-being”   can   be   considered   neglect. 39 Of   course,   what   is   “proper”   or  
“necessary”  is  still  a  subjective  determination,  but  it  is  clear  that  without  these  supports  the  child  
will be harmed.
State neglect and abuse laws require that   a   threat   is   “imminent”40 or   “serious”41 For
example,   in   Montana   a   report   of   abuse   or   neglect   “must   be   based   upon   perceived   present   real  
harm or a perceived present imminent risk  of  harm.”42 In  California  there  must  be  a  “substantial  
risk that the child will suffer[] serious physical  harm”  or  a  “substantial  risk  of  suffering   serious
emotional   damage.”43 To   be   considered   a   “threat   of   danger,”   the   threat   must   be   observable,  
immediate, severe, and out of control.44
Though there are some well-being situations that can be constructed as neglect with
serious, imminent harm to a child that warrants government involvement, there are several
common scenarios where well-being issues are erroneously used to justify state involvement.
Again, the problems below can become so extreme that they cross into actionable serious wellbeing threats to safety. Most cases, of course, do not solely involve well-being concerns, but the
discussion is most instructive after safety concerns have been remedied and one party continues to
advocate for out-of-home placement solely based on well-being concerns.
A. Poverty
While extreme poverty may negatively affect child well-being, eleven states and the
District of Columbia exempt poverty alone from   being   considered   “neglect.”45 Representative
language   is   found   in   the   D.C.   Code,   stating   that   “[t]he   term   ‘negligent   treatment’   or  
37

CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 46b-120(6) (West 2015) (emphasis added).

38

325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3 (West 2014) (emphasis added).

39

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.10, § 901(18)(b)(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added).

40

See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(v)(2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(4)(b)(West 2013); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 9:6-8.21(c)(4) (West 2015); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4-a)(i) (McKinney 2014).
41

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. 31-34-1-2(a)(1) (West 2014); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4002(6)(a) (2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 subdiv.2(f)(2) (West 2015); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-3-102(4)(b) (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX)(b) (2014); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4b)(i) (McKinney 2014); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(12g) (West 2014).
42

Gross v. Myers, 748 P.2d 459, 461 (Mont. 1987) (emphasis added).

43

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(c) (West 2014) (emphasis added).

44

Lund & Renne, supra note 10, at 9.

45

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-103(14)(A)(ii) (2014); D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2015); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.01(30)(f) (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(d)(1) (West 2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(18)
(2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX)(b) (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-02(8)(a) (2013) (exempting
poverty from definition of deprived child); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6304(a) (West 2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 261.001(4)(B)(iii) (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(16) (West 2014); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 49-13(11)(A)(i) (LexisNexis 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(12g) (West 2014).
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‘maltreatment’  means  failure  to  provide  [a  child  with]  adequate  food,  clothing,  shelter,  or  medical  
care, which includes medical neglect, and the deprivation is not due to the lack of financial means
of his or her parent, guardian, or other custodian.”46 In  other  states,  parents’  attorneys,  as  well  as  
children’s  attorneys,  can  argue  that  intervention  by  the  child  welfare  agency is inappropriate when
poverty is the only issue relating to the safety threshold. If the child is safe but living in
impoverished conditions, the belief that the child would be better off in foster care is not
sufficient. Further, other systems, such as housing authorities, electronic benefits programs, and
school   lunch   programs   can   help   impoverished   parents   address   the   agency’s   concerns   without  
child welfare involvement. Support programs that provide for subsistence levels of food and
shelter arguably establish a legislatively approved standard for minimally adequate well-being.
B. Unsanitary Conditions
“Dirty   house”   cases   can   rise   to   the   level   of   an   actionable   threat   when   the   home   is  
hazardous to the child.47 The conditions must create more than the basic hazards found in an
average household and must present more than a potential risk of harm. Again, even with such
hazards and a substantial risk of harm, the intervention must be proportional; an actionable threat
does not mean that the lawful action is removal. A child may be able to safely remain home if the
agency helps address the hazards. As the California Court of Appeal noted in one case:
County social service agencies cannot cast themselves in the role of a superOSHA for families. While we certainly hope  conditions  improve  in  [the  child’s]  
household, chronic messiness by itself and apart from any unsanitary conditions
or resulting illness or accident, is just not clear and convincing evidence of a
substantial risk of harm. . . .
The specific hazards which the social service agency identified . . . are trivial to
the point of being pretextual. A shorted lamp socket could occur in the White
House.   Motor   boats   normally   have   propellers   on   them.   Children’s   plastic  
wading pools do not come with filtration systems, and if they are filled with
water for any amount of time the water is going to become dirty. Worse hazards
than these may be found on practically every farm in America. If such
conditions were sufficient for removal from the home, generations of
Americans who grew up on farms and ranches would have spent their
childhoods in foster care.48
“Dirty  house”  cases  can  be  some  of  the  most  subjective  determinations,  as  described  in  
the introduction. If the child will almost certainly be harmed by staying in the home, they should
46

D.C. CODE § 16-2301(24) (2015) (emphasis added).

47

See, e.g., State v. Laura S. (In re Kennedy B.), No. A-10-274, 2010 WL 3958844, at *3, 6-8 (Neb. Ct.
App. Sept. 28, 2010) (overturning termination of parental rights in a dirty house case after the case worker testified that
“the  house  was  never  so  unsafe  that  the  children  could  not  have  a  visit”);;  In re R.W., 930 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ill. Ct. App.
2010) (overturning adjudication finding neglect because mother had cleaned dirty house by the time the petition was
filed).
48
Orange Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Susan E. (In re Paul E.), 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 289, 294-95 (Ct. App.
1995) (footnotes omitted).
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be removed. These types of hazards could include the presence of needles, glass, and animal feces
that could cause health problems. 49 “Dirty  house”  is  sometimes  conflated  with  a  parent’s  refusal  
to clean a cluttered home or address a hoarding   problem   that   speaks   to   the   parent’s   capacity   to  
care  for  the  child.  If  the  “dirty  house”  is  actually  indicative  of  a  parent’s  mental  health  issue  and  
not simply their disregard for the safety of the home, it should be treated as an issue separate and
apart from whether the home is a safe place to live.
C. Teen Parents
In cases involving teen parents, courts have held that children were improperly removed
solely because the teen parent was in foster care. In these cases, there were no threats to the
child’s  safety;;  rather,  the  removal  was  based  on  the  agency’s  apparent  belief  that  the  child’s  wellbeing   was   at   risk   due   to   the   mother’s   age   and   status   as   a   foster   child. 50 The threshold for
intervening based on well-being is not met when the sole concern is  the  parents’  age  or  placement  
in foster care—there must be an actual abuse or neglect allegation. 51 These situations sometimes
seem  to  be  motivated  by  the  state  seeking  funding  for  the  infant’s  foster  care  costs,  even  though  
federal regulations provide foster care payments for children placed with minor parents. 52 These
payments  meet  the  infant’s  needs  without  removal  from  the  minor  parent’s  legal  custody. 53 Teen
parents are still afforded the same Fourteenth Amendment protections as adult parents; their
children are not automatically unsafe just because they are a minor. 54
D. Substance Abuse
Judges and attorneys often encounter parental substance use and abuse in child welfare
cases.  Most  parties  agree  that  parental  substance  abuse  affects  a  child’s  well-being, but the more
important question is whether it affects the child in a serious way. A pair of recent cases held it
was improper to adjudicate children neglected due to parental substance abuse without specific
evidence  of  serious  threats  to  the  children’s safety.55 These decisions are especially important for
parents’  attorneys  whose  clients  may  struggle  with  substance  abuse  but  otherwise  provide  a  safe  
placement for the child.

49

A controversial issue right now is whether cockroach infestations are a health hazard since roaches can
exacerbate asthma in children. See Cockroaches and Pests, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://www.lung.org/healthyair/home/resources/cockroaches-and-pests.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2015). This is certainly an issue that may be factspecific to certain children and families, and falls outside the scope of this Article.
50
See, e.g., R.F.  v.  State  Dep’t  of  Human  Res., 740 So. 2d. 1093, 1093, 1095 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); In re
Hall, 703 A.2d 717, 718-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); See also In re Tayquon H., 821 A.2d 796, 799 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
51

See, e.g., R.F.  v.  State  Dep’t  of  Human  Res., 740 So. 2d. at 1095.

52

45 C.F.R § 1356.21(j) (2014) (implementing 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(B) (2012)).

53

Id.

54

See L.A.T. v. Dept. of Human Res. (In re J.T.), 588 So. 2d 471, (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).

55
Dep’t  of  Human  Servs.  v.  C.Z.  (In re K.A.M.), 236 P.3d 791, 794-95 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); S.S.  v.  Dep’t  
of Children & Families, 81 So. 3d 618, 621-22, 623-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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E. Parents with Disabilities
Questions surrounding the ability of parents with disabilities to provide adequate parental
care often touch on well-being. In In re N.E.F.-J., the appellate court held that the juvenile court
improperly concluded that the child was subjected to neglect because the mother was
developmentally delayed.56 The mother had limited understanding of child development and did
not  respond  perfectly  to  her  child’s  needs,  treating  her  one-year-old like an infant.57 She needed
the assistance of service providers and the family friend she lived with to help her care for her
children.58 Without  her  support  network,  the  threat  to  her  child’s  well-being might be serious, but
her situation lacked the necessary immediacy required for neglect. 59
If  measures  are  in  place  to  increase  the  parent’s  capacities  and  remove  threats  to  the child
and there is no sign that the supports will go away, the potential for harm to well-being is not
enough for court involvement. When parents have disabilities, advocates should remember to
balance the great benefits to children in remaining home with their parents.60
F. Educational Neglect and Truancy
Education and school attendance usually fall under well-being. Educational neglect
typically  involves  a  parent’s  failure  to  ensure  a  child’s  proper  education  while  truancy  is  usually  
focused   on   a   child’s   own failure to attend school. Lack of school attendance can pose a very
serious threat to child well-being, overcoming the threshold for unwelcome state involvement.
School attendance impacts well-being areas beyond educational attainment, such as social
activities, proper nutrition in the case of subsidized lunch programs, and risks the youth may be
exposed to while unsupervised during school hours. These threats to well-being can meet the
threshold for agency involvement. Still, parents have wide latitude in choosing how to educate
their   children   and   there   must   be   clear   threats   due   to   the   parents’   actions   or   inactions   to   be  
considered neglect. In In re Alexander G., for example, the appellate court found that although the
parents   were  uncooperative   with   the  school,   failed  to  address   their  child’s  behavioral  problems,  
and  “demonstrated  a  lack  of  good  parental  judgment,”  the  level  of  harm  from  the  parents’  inaction  
was insufficient for a neglect adjudication.61
Truancy cases are usually dealt with under status offense statutes holding the adolescent
responsible.   Typically,   the   child’s   behaviors   are   central   in   a   truancy   case   whereas   educational  
neglect falls on the parent, but the division between truancy and educational neglect can be
academic—the  difference  is  often  merely  the  child’s  age.  In  either  situation,  the  parents  are  only  
responsible if their actions or inactions led to the necessary level of harm regarding education and
school attendance. These types of cases are also often properly dealt with under the Individuals
56

Dep’t  of  Human  Servs.  v.  B.L.J.  (In re N.E.F.-J.), 268 P.3d 696, 699-700 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).

57

Id. at 698.

58

See id. at 698-99.

59

Id. at 700.

60

For more information, see Ella Callow, Maintaining Families When Parents Have Disabilities, 28 CHILD
L. PRAC. 133 (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/center_on_children_and_the_law
/parentrepresentation/maintaining_families.pdf.
61

In re Alexander G., 93 A.D.3d 904, 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
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with Disabilities Education Act62 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 63 These laws may
require services that help with behaviors or needs that exacerbate the conditions that put the child
at risk for removal.64
V. HOW THE AGENCY MAY INTERVENE
The appropriate balance of parental rights and protecting children means that involuntary
government action should be based on at least serious threats to well-being. Further, dispositional
decisions after that threshold is reached should be proportional to the situation. The following
explores how well-being issues can be addressed through increasing levels of child welfare
agency involvement. Without official court involvement, agencies can offer families voluntary
services, but sometimes the services come with the threat of court involvement and can hardly be
considered voluntary.
A. Voluntary Services
The least amount of interference with the family is when an agency merely suggests
actions to parents to address child well-being concerns but does not file a petition to place the
family under court supervision. When there is only a lower level well-being concern that does not
rise to a safety threat, this is the only type of intervention an agency can make. Offering voluntary
services may also occur when there is a report of abuse or neglect that is not substantiated (or
verified) by the agency. If the agency lacks grounds to file a petition because the situation does
not meet the threshold of being unsafe or a serious well-being threat, the case worker should make
it clear to the family that the recommendations are merely suggestions.
Voluntary services can be a great tool for preventing further state involvement and
improving outcomes for children when parents are agreeable. Caseworkers know about services
that may help families mitigate any potential threats before the situation reaches a legally
actionable threshold. The agency may also have influence with service providers who can assist
the family.
The next level of involvement after purely voluntary services is when the agency has
grounds to intervene, but the parent voluntarily agrees to a plan to address the problem without
the  court’s  involvement.  Again, while most agency policies are primarily written regarding child
safety, serious well-being concerns could justify entering a plan with a family in many states.
Often  the  remedy  involves  a  written  “safety  plan,”  an  agreement  put  in  place  to  mitigate  threats to
the  child,  reduce  the  child’s  vulnerability,  and  increase  the  parents’  ability  to  care  for  the  child  so  
the child may remain at home if possible. 65
62

20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012).

63
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) (amended 2014). For more information, see
Joseph B. Tulman, Using Special Education Advocacy to Avoid or Resolve Status Offense Charges, in REPRESENTING
JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS 89 (Sally Small Inada & Claire S. Chiamulera eds., 2010),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/RJSO_FINAL.pdf
(discussing
how
lawyers can assist children in receiving benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act).
64

See Tulman, supra note 63.

65

See Lund & Renne, supra note 10, at 21.
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B.  “Voluntary”  Services
Offering preventative services to families on a voluntary basis when there is no serious
threat   to   the   child   leads   to   a   number   of   concerns   about   whether   “voluntary   services”   are   really  
voluntary. Parents may feel coerced into a safety plan because they believe compliance is required
to keep their child, or the agency may threaten to file a dependency petition if the parents do not
agree to the plan. Most case law on alleged coercion regarding safety plans unsurprisingly
addresses safety concerns, but the potential for improper coercion is high if a case is based largely
on well-being allegations.
In Dupuy v. Samuels,   the   court   analogizes   the   offer   of   a   safety   plan   to   a   prosecutor’s  
offer of a plea agreement, and to an interim agreement in a tort settlement—the outcome may be
better for the individual if they take the plea or settlement offer, but they are not required to
accept.66 If the agency threatens to go forward with court proceedings if the parents do not agree
to the plan and they have the proper grounds to do so, they are not coercing the parents but
asserting their legal rights.67 However, because courts are less likely to remove children solely for
well-being concerns, the agency must accurately acknowledge the legal actions they could take
when negotiating a plan where there are merely threats to well-being. In most jurisdictions no
attorneys are assigned to parents in the pre-petition stage, but in the minority where they are,
advice of counsel as to likely outcomes and rights regarding voluntary participation can be
helpful.
VI. HOW COURTS MAY INTERVENE
Once a well-being concern rises to a serious level where the potential for harm is
involved, the agency may file a petition. Again, the level of intervention should still be
proportional to the situation with no more agency intervention than is warranted. Filing a petition
does not automatically mean the child should be removed. The spectrum of court-ordered services
ranges from mandatory services while children remain at home to the removal of the child from
the home. Regardless, in all situations court involvement usually brings the benefits of legal
representation for the parents and the child and of judicial oversight that holds families and the
child welfare agency accountable. A dependency adjudication, or finding that the family is in
need of court supervision, also  gives  the  court  authority  to  make  orders  to  promote  a  child’s  wellbeing whether they are placed at home or in care.
A. Court-Ordered In-Home Services
If a child is adjudicated dependent, the court may order the family to take certain actions
with or without agency oversight. While it is uncommon for agencies to file petitions when they
are not seeking removal, the option of leaving the child in the home with protective services in
place is available in every state. The federal requirement that a child be placed in the leastrestrictive, most family-like environment68 supports this type of action because placement in the
66

Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2006).

67

Id. at 762.

68

42  U.S.C.  §  675(5)(A)  (2012);;  Each  child  must  have  a  case  plan  that  provides  for  “a  safe  setting  that  is  
the least restrictive  (most  family  like)  and  most  appropriate  setting  available  and  in  close  proximity  to  the  parents’  home,  
consistent  with  the  best  interest  and  special  needs  of  the  child.”  Id.
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home is the least-restrictive setting if it is safe. 69 However, the court may or may not agree with
the   agency’s   recommendation   that   the   child remain at home once a petition is filed. Agencies
might opt for court-ordered   services   as   opposed   to   voluntary   services   because   the   parents’  
compliance with court-ordered  plans  has  different  “teeth”  under  court  supervision.  Unlike  when  a  
parent voluntarily engages in services,70 if parents do not comply with the terms of a courtordered plan, their lack of compliance may be used against them. 71
B. Removal
While the court may compel cooperation with services when serious well-being concerns
arise, a child should not be removed unless the child is unsafe. As discussed above, reasonable
efforts must be made to prevent removal; if the child still has to be removed, reasonable efforts
must   be   made   immediately   to   “make   it   possible   for   a   child   to   safely return”   home.72 After
removal, efforts by the attorneys and the agency focus on attempting safe reunification, a case
plan   is   intended   to   “facilitate   return   of   the   child   to   his   own   safe home”73 and periodic review
hearings  must  be  held  to  review  efforts  “toward  alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating
placement   in   foster   care.”74 Once a child is removed, safety becomes the main requirement for
return.
The need for this higher standard for removal focused on safety, instead of just wellbeing concerns, long predates current statutes. In 1955, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
described a number of well-being concerns that did not meet the threshold for removal, noting
that the lives of almost all children can be improved in some way:
A  child  cannot  be  declared  “neglected”  merely  because  his  condition  might  be  
improved by changing his parents. The welfare of many children might be
served by taking them from their homes and placing them in what the officials
may consider a better home. But the [law] was not intended to provide a
procedure to take the children of the poor and give them to the rich, nor to take
the children of the illiterate and give them to the educated, nor to take the
children of the crude and give them to the cultured, nor to take the children of
the weak and sickly and give them to the strong and healthy. 75
Though  “safe”  is  rarely  defined  in  state  statutes,  years  of  collaboration  with  judges,  child  
69

See In re L.L., No. 10-0469, 2010 WL 1881857, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12, 2010).

70

See M.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dept. of Child Servs. (In re B.N.), 969 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
(refusing to consider   the   mother’s   lack   of  participation   in   voluntary   programs,  in   determining   whether   children   were   in  
need of services).
71

State v. Lerry M. (In re Devin W.), 707 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Neb. 2005) (acknowledging the juvenile
court’s  finding  that  “it  would  be  contrary  to  [the  child’s]  welfare,  health,  and  safety”  for  him  to  remain  in  the  home  due  to
the  parents’  failure  to  follow  the  safety  plan).
72

42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(B)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added).

73

42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).

74

42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (2012).

75

In re Rinker, 117 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955).
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welfare workers, and attorneys by the National Child Welfare Resource Centers on Child
Protective Services and Legal and Judicial Issues resulted in a definition that has broad consensus:
children  are  unsafe  when  “threats  of  danger  exist  within  the  family  and  children  are  vulnerable  to  
such threats, and parents have insufficient protective capacities to manage  or  control  threats.”76
As mentioned earlier, extreme situations can arise where well-being concerns cross over
into safety domains. For example, while children should probably not eat fast food every day, a
daily   diet   of   McDonald’s   would   very   rarely   be considered grounds for intervention or removal.
However, in a specific case, such a diet might actually pose certain, immediate harm to a child. In
In re Brittany T., while discussing the very few cases it found regarding removals due to parents
neglecting   to   address   child   obesity,   the   New   York   Court   noted,   “state   intervention   would  
generally  ‘not  be  justified . . . simply because a child was overweight, or did not simply engage in
a   healthy   and   fit   lifestyle.’   However,   where,   as   here,   there   are   clear   medical standards and
convincing evidence that there exist severe, life-limiting dangers due to parental lifestyle and
persistent neglect,  removal  is  justified.”77
In addition to the practical difficulty of determining when a serious well-being threat
crosses into unsafe territory, there is other potential for confusion. At a disposition stage where a
parent seeks to retain custody, the state must prove that removal is the least-restrictive alternative
that will ensure safety.78 However, many state statutes use “best  interests”  to  guide  decisions  in  
removal hearings, assessing factors that can overlap substantially with well-being. The federal
statute and many state statutes also require the all-encompassing finding that remaining in the
home is contrary to a child’s  “welfare.”79 Some states require both. For example, in Idaho, in an
order  for  “removal  of  the  child  [or  children]  from  the  home,”  the  court  is  to  make  “written,  casespecific findings that remaining in the home is contrary to the [child’s  or  children’s] welfare and
that vesting legal custody with the [agency] is in the best interest of the child [or children].”80
Some confusion likely comes from professionals also working in private custody cases, where
“best  interests”  is  the  correct  standard;;  for  example between two parents.81
Going back to the triad, especially when statutes require consideration of issues like best
interests that overlap with well-being, it may seem that well-being and safety are on equal footing.
This is not the case: safety first, well-being second. If leaving the child in the home is not safe and
cannot be made safe, only then is it appropriate for the court and the agency to consider what is
best  for  the  child  with  regards  to  the  child’s  well-being. The proper standard, given the balancing
scheme, is to consider whether to remove on safety criteria before moving on to well-being
considerations.

76

Lund & Renne, supra note 10, at 2 (emphasis omitted).

77

In re Brittany T., 835 N.Y.S.2d 829, 839 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007) (alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted) (quoting In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 358 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 2002)), rev’d  on  other  grounds, 48 A.D.
3d 995 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
78

See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (15)(A)-(B) (2012).

79

42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).

80

Idaho Juv. R. 34(b) (2014).

81

See, e.g., T.N.L.  v.  Dep’t  of  Children  &  Families,  132  So.  3d  319,  324  (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2014).
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C. Out-of-Home Care
If the state has assumed physical care for the child, the agency has broad authority and an
obligation to provide for the child’s   well-being. Less clear is the level of authority a parent
continues to have over day-to-day well-being  needs  given  the  agency’s  often  enumerated  duties.  
The best practice is that parents with a reunification goal be a part of the decision-making process
and activities to promote child well-being. While the court may have impliedly acknowledged a
parent’s  missteps  regarding  some   safety  aspects,  it  does  not  automatically  follow  that  the  parent  
can no longer make other decisions. Parents know their child better than newly acquainted
professionals and caregivers. Thus, their involvement in education, health, and mental health can
be a benefit from the information-gathering perspective. Additionally, children almost always
benefit from continued relationships with their parents.82
Child welfare practice has evolved more than the law to address this issue in recent
years. Family-centered practice and other inclusive strength-based approaches focus on greater
family involvement in case planning to yield better outcomes for the family. 83 The emphasis on
parental involvement is echoed in federal regulations requiring that case plans be developed
jointly with parents.84 Both casework practice and the requirement of jointly developed case plans
let parents participate in decisions when the child is in or at risk of out-of-home placement.
Parental visitation and attendance at appointments supports the child mentally and
emotionally, so courts and attorneys should make every effort to ensure the parent-child
relationship is continually nurtured.
[T]he parent should be encouraged to accompany the child to medical
appointments   and   therapy   sessions.   Involvement   in   the   child’s   professional  
appointments   keeps   the   parent   informed   about   the   child’s   developmental  
progress and special needs, teaches the parent to respond more effectively to the
child’s   needs,   and   reinforces   the   parent’s   continuing   involvement   in   and  
responsibility  for  the  child’s  well-being.”85
This involvement of course can be supported by attorneys. Depending on the case,
however,  parents’  attorneys  may  need  to  consider  whether  parental  involvement  in  these  activities  
should be via an informal agreement between the parties or through case plan requirements that
could be later held against a parent should they fail to meet them. Time constraints should also be
considered, and prioritization should go towards completion of the most safety-related items.
Where the goal is for the child to return home, parental involvement while the child is out of care
can support the  child’s  well-being and ease the transition home.

82

See Doyle, supra note 3.

83

See Nat’l  Child  Welfare  Res.  Ctr.  for  Family-Centered Practice, Can We Put Clothes on This Emperor?,
BEST PRAC./NEXT PRAC., Summer 2000, at 7, 7, http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads
/newsletter/BPNPSummer00.pdf (discussing family-centered practice).
84

45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(1) (2014).

85
MARGARET SMARIGA, VISITATION WITH INFANTS AND TODDLERS IN FOSTER CARE: WHAT JUDGES AND
ATTORNEYS NEED TO KNOW 13 (Claire Sandt Chiamulera ed., 2007), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/visitation_brief.authcheckdam.pdf.
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D. Reunification
Decisions to reunify the child after removal should be based on safety, 86 not on wellbeing  or  “best  interests.”  When  the  goal  is  reunification,  the  agency  has  an  obligation  to  develop  a  
case  plan  with  the  parents’  (and  often  child’s)  participation  that  is  individually  tailored  to  address  
the specific safety threats and enhance protective capacities so the child can return home. Once
safety threats have been reduced or parental protective capacities have been enhanced, the child
should be returned. After the child returns home, the court or the agency can continue to be
involved with voluntary or court-ordered in-home services if serious well-being concerns remain.
If a parent is able to provide a safe environment for the child, return should not hinge on
well-being concerns such as whether the parent is employed.87 A  parent’s  literacy  or  educational  
attainment are also not safety concerns even though they can serve to support the child in valuable
ways.88 Similarly, financial instability may be a concern but it does not rise to the level of a
serious threat of harm. 89 A parent needs to have adequate resources to care for their child, but
parents and children should not be separated just because they are poor.90
Some courts have found on balance that while emotional stability is important, a child
that  has  not  “sufficiently  bonded”  with  her  parent  should  not  remain  in  foster  care  when  the  parent  
is a safe caregiver, even if the child has a significant bond with another adult.91 As the California
Court of Appeal stated in David B.,”[i]t   cannot   mean   merely   that   the   parent   in   question   is   less  
than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or
seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member. . . . We are looking for

86

Periodic reviews are required

in order to determine the safety of the child, the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and the extent of progress which has been
made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and to
project a likely date by which the child may be returned to and safely maintained in the home or
placed for adoption or legal guardianship[]. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
87

See David B. v. Super. Ct. of Orange Cnty., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336, 354-55 (Ct. App. 2004) (discussing that
there  was  no  evidence  that  the  father’s  home  was  physically  unsafe,  and  that  unemployment  should  not  bar  reunification  
with father); see also In re H.V., 37 A.3d 588, 594-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (explaining the goal change from reunification
to  relative  placement  because  the  mother’s  boyfriend  had  a  criminal  record  was  improper  when  the  offense   was  not  for  
domestic violence or anything child-related); M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 254 S.W.3d
846, 854-55   (Ky.   Ct.   App.   2008)   (holding   the   mother’s   hospitalization   and   incarceration   did   not   constitute   abuse   or  
neglect).
88

See David B.,  20  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  at  351  (explaining  that  a  parent’s  illiteracy  should  not  be  considered  in  the  
court’s  determination  of  parental  fitness).
89

See S.C. Dep’t  of  Soc.  Servs.  v.  Mother, 720 S.E.2d 920, 926 (S.C. Ct. App.) (refusing to characterize

“[m]other’s   limited   financial   ability   .   .   .   as   causing   an   ‘unreasonable   risk  of   harm’”   and  determining   that   continued  inhome services should be provided instead of changing the plan to terminate parental rights).
90

See David B., 20  Cal.  Rptr.  3d  at  354  (“We  cannot  separate  parents  and  their  children  merely  because  
they  are  poor.”);;  Dep’t  of  Soc.  Servs. 720 S.E.2d at 926.
91

E.g., David B., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 351; M.E.C., 254 S.W.3d at 855.
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passing  grades  here,  not  straight  A’s.” 92
Reunification also cannot be denied based on what could potentially happen in the future
if all safety threats are currently addressed. Like the harm in a neglect finding must be serious or
imminent, the safety risk to the child must be real and present to prevent reunification.
Recognizing there is always some risk in reunification, the court in David B. stated,   “[i]f   an  
absolute guarantee of safety were required, we have a difficult time envisioning a case in which
the court could properly return a child to parental custody. Even the mythical perfect parent
cannot guarantee anything.”93
If the parents are unwilling or unable to correct the  conditions  that  resulted  in  the  child’s  
placement into care, the court can rule out reunification. 94 To rule out reunification, the agency
must  prove  that  reunification  with  the  parent  would  risk  the  child’s  safety  and  the  risks  cannot  be  
remedied in the reasonable future. When well-being is on a continuum with safety, as discussed
above, this might mean that the parents are not able to downgrade the problem from a safety
threat to just a well-being concern. Like with the Brittany T. case, there are extreme examples
where   neglecting   a   child’s   well-being crosses into the safety realm and is sufficient to prevent
reunification if not properly addressed. In L.P.R., the court found return was inappropriate due to
an emotionally unsafe situation.95 The child had been removed from the mother due to physical
abuse and the father had participated in services and in visits. 96 However, the child was diagnosed
with post-traumatic stress disorder and was particularly sensitive to sound; the father had a history
of loud, verbally aggressive behavior that was unlikely to change due to his mental illness. 97
Under   the   particular   facts,   the   court   found   reunification   with   the   parents   would   be   “extremely  
threatening   and   detrimental”   to   the   child’s   health,   justifying   changing   the permanency plan and
ruling out reunification.98
E. Other Permanency Goals
When reunification is properly ruled out by a court, the case will usually proceed with
permanency and well-being issues at the forefront. When the court is deciding where to place the
child—whether between relatives or unrelated foster parents—the available options have been
vetted for safety through home studies. Ideally, parties should use concurrent planning to identify
and assess all safe options early in the case, even while reunification efforts are in full swing, to
prevent a delay in identifying an appropriate placement or goal once reunification is ruled out.
92

David B., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 352.

93

Id. at 358.

94

See, e.g., In re Dezerea G.,  97  A.D.3d  933,  935  (N.Y.  App.  Div.  2012)  (holding  the  mother’s  relationship  
with the child’s  abusive  father  made  it  clear  the  child  would  not  be  safe  in  the  home);;  Dep’t  of  Human  Servs.  v.  T.R.  (In re
T.M.R.), 282 P.3d 969, 975 (Or. App. 2012) (upholding the change of the goal away from reunification where parents
continued to offer no plausible  explanation  for  child’s  numerous  bone  fractures  and  bruises).  
95

Dep’t.  of  Human  Servs.  v.  S.N.  (In re L.P.R.) 282 P.3d 901, 908 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).

96

Id. at 903.

97

Id. at 905, 907-08.

98
Id.; see also In re Joseph D., No. B156524, 2002 WL 1288735, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. June 11, 2002)
(holding   youth’s   fear   of   mother   because   of   her   prior   abuse   and   youth’s   desire   not   to   be   reunited   with   her   constituted  
compelling evidence that reunification would be detrimental to youth).. App. 2012)
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Once reunification is no longer an option, the court faces the task of making placement
decisions between relatives or other caregivers. Courts are given wide discretion in these
decisions, though relatives have some advantages over others. Relatives are usually given
preference in placement and permanency decisions—a  recognition  that  a  child’s   well-being and
permanency often benefit from relative connections. The ASFA, strengthened by the Fostering
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act 99 (“Fostering  Connections”)  in  this  regard,  
provides   that   states   “shall   consider   giving   preference   to   an   adult   relative   over a non-related
caregiver when determining a placement for a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all
relevant   [s]tate   child   protection   standards.”100 Many state statutes are even clearer on relative
preference. Rather than considering giving a preference,  more  typical  language  reads,  “the  court  
shall   give   preferential   consideration   to   an   adult   relative   over   a   nonrelated   caregiver.” 101 Cases
involving the Indian Child Welfare Act 102 (“ICWA”)   have   much   stronger   protections   for   the  
family and tribe.103
Another advantage relatives have is that some well-being concerns that are not safetyrelated   can   be   “waived”   for   relatives.   Fostering   Connections   added   the   provision   that   child  
welfare   agencies  could  establish  policies   for   waiving   “non-safety  standards”  on a   “case-by-case
basis . . .   in   relative   foster   family   homes   for   specific   children   in   care,” 104 though this practice
existed in many states before Fostering Connections passed. 105 According to data provided to the
Children’s   Bureau,   waivers   have   often   been   granted to relatives for things such as lacking
adequate income, medical problems, home maintenance issues, adequate furnishings, and lacking
home telephones.106 While   improving   a   child’s   well-being cannot be the primary reason for
removal from her parents or preventing reunification, it can be the driving consideration once the
parents are no longer an option.

99

Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat.
3949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
100

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (2012).

101

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (2014). See also ALASKA STAT. § 47.14.100(e)-(f) (2014); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 361.3(a) (West Supp. 2015); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(j)(3) (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 161629(11) (2014); IND. CODE § 31-34-4-2 (West 2014); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. ART. 622(B)(1)-(2) (2014); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 22, § 4062(4) (2013); MINN. STAT. § 260C.212 subdiv.2 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT § 210.565(1)-(4) (West
2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.550 (LexisNexis 2013).
102

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.)
103

Family and tribal placement preferences are to be applied unless there  is  “good  cause  to  the  contrary.”  
25 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
104

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) (2010).

105
Rob Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice, 14 FUTURE CHILD. 131, 138 (2004),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01_07.pdf.
106
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STATES’ USE OF WAIVERS OF NON-SAFETY LICENSING
STANDARDS FOR RELATIVE FOSTER FAMILY HOMES 8
(2011), www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files
/cb/report_congress_statesuse.pdf.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Well-being   is   regularly   addressed   by   judges   and   attorneys   regarding   the   child’s  
educational needs, which home will provide the most emotional support, and whether physical
and mental health services are being obtained. These are crucial considerations and the oversight
of  judges  and  attorneys  helps  children  succeed  and  thrive.  While  a  child’s  well-being should be
continually addressed, there are limited instances when it should be the driver in the case. Wellbeing concerns should not outweigh a safe reunification; a child should not wait in care while the
court works to ensure every aspect of well-being is supported in a home that is safe. Every
childhood could be changed to improve well-being. The dominating question is: are those
improvements worth a child losing her family?
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